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Analyses of United States post-Cold War foreign policy in the Persian Gulf 
symbolize UHDOLVP¶V QHZ IRXQG FRQFHUQ ZLWK IRUHign policy analysis. 
Prominent realists attribute specific policies to domestic concerns and how 
they have dominated policymaking in the era of US primacy. Although 
convincing, this perspective is not comprehensive. By drawing on regional 
security complex theory it is possible to map the regional developments which 
have equally constrained and incentivized the rise and fall of dual 
containment. This more extensive account produces two important findings 
UHJDUGLQJ UHDOLVP¶V QHJOHFW RI WKH UHJLRQDO OHYHO RI DQDO\VLV )LUVW UHDOLVWV 
overstate the domestic determinants of US policy in the Persian Gulf. Second, 
and more broadly, realist foreign policy analysts underspecify systemic 
SUHVVXUHVZKLFKVKDSHDQGVKRYHDFRXQWU\¶VIRUHLJQSROLF\ 
Introduction 
Realism is traditionally portrayed as a systemic theory; consequently it has been criticized for 
failing to explain specific policy outcomes (Elman 1996). In response, those sympathetic to 
the tradition have developed realist foreign policy analysis ± a synthesis of foreign policy 
analysis and realism. Despite earlier work being neorealist, the recent work of John 
Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt falls into the realist foreign policy analysis school. In 
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explaining post-Cold War US foreign policy in the Persian Gulf they reject the deterministic 
claim that unipolarity has conditioned the expansion of US foreign policy. Instead, they show 
that particular domestic influences have incentivized policymakers to act on the permissive 
international environment in specific ways. 
Realist foreign policy analysts, however, overlook important systemic influences which have 
shaped US foreign policy, notably factors located at the regional level of analysis. Barry 
%X]DQ¶V Uegional security complex theory (RSCT) corrects for this. Whilst %X]DQ¶V theory 
has predominantly been employed to analyze regional security interactions, it also has the 
capacity to examine the extent to which regional dynamics influence nonregional powers¶ 
foreign policy. Accordingly, this research integrates realist foreign policy analysis with 
RSCT to create realist foreign policy analysis with a twist. Its contribution is then illustrated 
through an examination of US foreign policy in the Persian Gulf ± the most obvious example 
of $PHULFD¶V expanding interests in the post-Cold War era and a case which has been 
discussed prominently by realists. 
Unsurprisingly this controversial case has already been analyzed in the RSCT literature, 
although the results are unsatisfactory. The literature distinguishes between pre and post-Gulf 
:DUSROLF\E\RQO\H[DPLQLQJWKHUHJLRQ¶VLQIOXHQFHGXULQJWKHIRUPHU(GZDUGVlike 
Mearsheimer and Walt it overstates the importance of the domestic level of analysis (Gause 
2010); or the analysis ends IROORZLQJ WKH UROOEDFN RI ,UDT¶V DQQexation of Kuwait (Yetiv 
1995). An analysis of US foreign policy in the Persian Gulf which remains true to the 
principle that the regional level of analysis can crucially influence US foreign policy will 
therefore also contribute to the RSCT literature. 
The remainder of this paper is divided into three sections. The first sketches realist foreign 
policy analysis explanations for the post-Cold War expansion of US foreign policy in the 
Persian Gulf. The second then outlines RSCT. The third then considers the extent to which 
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developments at the regional level have shaped US foreign policy. The paper makes two 
contributions: theoretically it argues that realist foreign policy analysis needs to greater 
appreciate how a great power¶s foreign policy is influenced by systemic pressures located 
beyond the international distribution of power; and empirically the research illustrates that the 
3HUVLDQ*XOI¶VUHJLRQDO security dynamics have crucially influenced US foreign policy in the 
post-Cold War era. If correct, the logical consequence of this argument is that realist foreign 
policy analysts have overstated the influence that domestic factors have had on US foreign 
policy in the Persian Gulf. 
 Realism and the Expansion of US Foreign Policy 
,IDQH[SDQVLRQRIDVWDWH¶VIRUHLJQSROLF\UHIHUVWRthe broadening of its goals, interests, and 
scope of action (Zakaria 1998:19), then in no other region has US foreign policy expanded 
more than in the Persian Gulf. In the post-Cold War era the US has forcibly reversed ,UDT¶V
annexation of Kuwait; increased its regional security commitments; committed itself to 
containing Iran and Iraq; and then invaded Iraq. Realists would traditionally explain this via 
systemic incentives: cODVVLFDO DSSURDFKHV VXJJHVW WKDW DV D VWDWH¶V UHODWLYH FDSDELOLWLHV
increase, the scope of its national interest will do likewise (Zakaria 1998:18-20); offensive 
neorealists contend that anarchy, offensive military capabilities, and uncertainty hardwires 
into all powers a desire to expand (Mearsheimer 2001:2-3); whilst Waltz (2008:xii-xiv) 
argued WKDW ZKHQ D VWDWH¶V FDSDELOLWLHV DUH XQEDODQFHG LW KDV PRUH ODWLWXGH WR WDNH VHOI-
interested actions.  
Systemic perspectives overlook agency and contingency, however. As Wolfers (1962:41) 
FRPPHQWHG ³1R PDWWHU KRZ SRZHUIXO WKH RQVODXJKW RI H[WHUQDO IRUFHV, men are not 
traQVIRUPHGLQWRPHUHDXWRPDWRQV´Although an increase in relative capabilities may create 
an opportunity for a state to increase the scope of its foreign policy, the specifics of how, 
when, and why it does so are uncertain (Zakaria 1998:12). This is the neoclassical realist 
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argument. Neoclassical realists accept that the international system defines the scope of a 
FRXQWU\¶V foreign policy. Nevertheless, they contend that how policymakers act on these 
conditions is dependent upon perceptions of relative power, intellectual trends, bureaucratic 
processes and institutions, individual groups and actors, and state resources (Rose 1998; 
Schweller 2003; Taliaferro, Lobell, and Ripsman 2009). Neoclassical realists can therefore be 
distinguished from neorealists because they explain the foreign policies a state pursues rather 
than systemic outcomes. As such, neoclassical realists are realist foreign policy analysts 
(Taliaferro 2000:132-134).  
$OWKRXJK 0HDUVKHLPHU¶V (2001) DQG :DOW¶V (1987,1996) earlier work was neorealist, their 
recent work relates to neoclassical realism and can therefore be defined as realist foreign 
policy analysis. Like neoclassical realists Mearsheimer and Walt (2008:229-230) stress the 
importance, although not in a deterministic fashion, of the international system. Additionally, 
like neoclassical realists, they focus on foreign policy decisions as opposed to systemic 
outcomes (Mearsheimer 2011; Walt 2011). Furthermore, in common with other neoclassical 
realists (Schweller 2006), Mearsheimer and Walt (2007) are concerned with illustrating how 
domestic political influences can cause a state to pursue suboptimal foreign policies. Indeed, 
Mearsheimer  FRQWHQGV WKDW VWDWHV ³RIWHQ SXUVXH PLVJXLGHG IRUHLJQ SROLFLHV
because domestic politics intrude into the policy-making process and trump sound strategic 
ORJLF´ 
Whether employing domestic politics to explain suboptimal foreign policy decisions is 
central to neoclassical realism is debatable: some consider it to be WKH VFKRRO¶V main 
contribution (Rathbun 2008) whilst others contend that neoclassical realism is chiefly 
concerned with illustrating how all domestic influences ± not just parochial interests ± act as 
a filter through which systemic imperatives are understood (Ripsman 2009). Irrespective of 
this, however, Mearsheimer and Walt and neoclassical realists more broadly symbolize 
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UHDOLVP¶V QHZ IRXQG FRQFHUQ ZLWK IRUHLJQ SROLF\ DQDO\VLV Rather than seeing the 
LQWHUQDWLRQDO V\VWHP DV GHWHUPLQLQJ D VWDWH¶V IRUHLJQ SROLF\, WKH\ EXLOG XSRQ :DOW]¶V
(2000:24) claim that the structure shapes and shoves but does not determine DVWDWH¶VIRUHLJQ
policy.  
From this perspective unipolarity ± the system ± did not determine the expansion of US 
foreign policy; rather US foreign policy expanded because of domestic influences which 
induced policymakers to act on systemic incentives in specific ways, which is illustrated 
through the most obvious case of Americas expanding interests and scope of action, namely 
policy in the Persian Gulf. Realist foreign policy analysts contend that dual containment in 
the Persian Gulf was conditioned by systemic change, the prevailing intellectual climate, and 
the influence of powerful lobbyists. The Clinton administration was wedded to a belief in 
American exceptionalism, what might be termed the indispensable nation thesis. For 
Mearsheimer (2011:32) and Walt (2005) this intellectual climate was central to dual 
containment: the indispensable nation thesis inspired policymakers to pursue dual 
containment as opposed to a balance of power strategy. Equally important, the Israeli lobby 
exercised formidable influence on the policymaking process. Indeed, Quoting Kenneth 
Pollack, an advisor in the National Security Council, Mearsheimer and Walt (2008:286-288) 
DUJXH WKDW LW ZDV ,VUDHO¶V IHDU RI ,UDQ DQG VXEVHTXHQW SUHVVXUH E\ WKH ,VUDHOL OREE\ ZKLFK
caused the Clinton administration to antagonize Iran. In turn, the US missed an opportunity to 
ally itself with Iran in order to balance Iraq (Mearsheimer 2002:16).  
Similar ideas also H[SODLQ$PHULFD¶VSRVW-containment policy. The events of 9/11 engendered 
the ascendancy of neoconservatism, which advocated democratic militarism to transform the 
Middle East (Mearsheimer 2005,2011; Monten 2005; Walt 2012). Of equal importance, 
however, was the role of the Israeli lobby which, along with neoconservative intellectuals, 
manipulated intelligence and sold the war to a sceptical public. As Mearsheimer and Walt 
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FRQWHQGWKHOREE\³VXFFHVVIXOO\SUHVVHGIRUDSDUWLFXODUVHWRISROLFLHV«ZLWKRXW
WKHLUHIIRUWV$PHULFDZRXOGSUREDEO\QRWEHLQ,UDT´7UXHWRWKHLUQeorealist roots, however, 
they argue that these influencHV ZHUH FRPSOHPHQWHG E\ $PHULFD¶V V\VWHPLF primacy 
(Mearsheimer and Walt 2008:229-230). And again, they argue that $PHULFD¶VLQWHUHVWVLQWKH
Gulf would have been better served by ensuring Iran balance Iraq or vice-versa (Mearsheimer 
2002:16).  
Although convincing, the realist foreign policy analyst perspective is not comprehensive 
because it utilizes a thin understanding of systemic influence: following Waltz (1979) realist 
foreign policy analysts reduce the system to the international distribution of capabilities, 
which is problematic 8QGHU ³FORVHU REVHUYDWLRQ´ 0RUJHQWKDX  ZURWH ³>WKH
international] system is frequently composed of a number of subV\VWHPV«WKDW PDLQWDLQ
ZLWKLQWKHPVHOYHVDEDODQFHRISRZHURIWKHLURZQ´Although realist foreign policy analysts 
recognize the importance of the regional level of analysis (Lobell 2009:49-50; Taliaferro 
2012), systemic pressure is often reduced to the international distribution of power, especially 
when discussing US policy (Paul 2012:11). But if in the post-Cold War era the regional level 
is even more salient, as some conclude (Buzan 1991b:439-442; Lake and Morgan 1997:3-7), 
then this oversight is untenable. If true, then realist foreign policy analysts underspecify the 
systemic factors whiFKLQIOXHQFHDFRXQWU\¶VIRUHLJQSROLF\ 
Regional Security Complex Theory 
This is what British structural realists would argue. They have provided one of the most 
sophisticated critiques of :DOW]¶V neorealism. Although accepting elements of neorealism, 
WKH\ DUJXH WKDW D GHHSHU ³V\VWHP WKHRU\ QHHGV WR FRQWDLQ PRUH WKDQ :DOW]¶V VWUXFWXUH´
(Buzan, Little, and Jones 1993:29). Accordingly they suggest four refinements which are 
argued to result in a deeper systemic theory. First, while accepting the durability of anarchy, 
British structural realists show that it does not force all states to become functionally alike. 
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Second, they challenge QHRUHDOLVP¶V narrow material focus; instead they call for a sectorial 
approach which recognizes the importance of economic, societal, and strategic factors. Third, 
they argue that a system is composed of units, structures, and interactions, and that the 
V\VWHP¶V interaction capacity ± its level of technological development and shared norms ± 
also influences DVWDWH¶Vpossible action (Buzan, Jones, and Little 1993:30-33,38,69-72,132-
168; Buzan and Little 1996).  
It is %ULWLVKVWUXFWXUDOUHDOLVP¶s fourth refinement, which is primarily concerned with the unit 
level, which provides a pathway for thinking about the regional level of analysis. British 
structural realists contend that the unit level is critical because states have specific attributes, 
VXFKDV³EXUHDXFUDWLFSURFHVVOHDGHUVKip personality, the organization of the government, and 
WKHRUJDQL]LQJLGHRORJ\RIWKHVWDWH´ZKLFKVKDSHSROLF\RXWFRPHV%X]DQ-Rnes, and Little 
1993:47), which is precisely what realist foreign policy analysts contend. But in addition, 
they contend that units interact with each other and in doing so they generate process 
formations.  
These are essentially action-reaction theories, in which the key element is a dynamic of 
stimulus and response. Many recurrent patterns have been found in these often very complex 
dynamics, and it is the elements of consistency in these patterns that inspire attempts at theory. 
The best known of them include war, alliance, the balance of power, arms racing and the 
security dilemma, and the whole range of international political economy patterns arising from 
SURWHFWLRQLVWDQG LOOLEHUDOSROLFLHVRQ WUDGHDQGPRQH\%X]DQ¶VFRQFHSWRI UHJLRQDOVHFXULW\
complexes also belong in this category, since it is based on durable, but not permanent 
patterns in the degree of amity, enmity, and indifference with which states view each other 
(Buzan, Jones, and Little 1993:48). 
Before elaborating on RSCT it is necessary to clarify some issues. First, RSCT is part of a 
wider literature emphasizing the importance of the regional level of analysis (Lake and 
Morgan 1997; Katzenstein 2005; Paul 2012), so why focus solely on it? This is because 
8 
 
³>%X]DQ@KDVEHHQWKHRQHWRPRVWWKRURXJKO\OD\RXWYDULDEOHVGLVWLQFWWRUHJLRQVWKDWPDNH
ORFDOSROLWLFVXQLTXH´ZKLFKLQWXUQPHDQVWKDWKLVZRUNKDVLQformed much of the literature 
(Kelly 2007:206). Second, especially in Regions and Powers, RSCT is infused with 
securitization theory, where security is not given but is instead constructed (Buzan, Wæver, 
and de Wilde 1998). The focus here is restricted to RSCT not because securitization theory is 
unhelpful; however it does not aid thLVSDSHU¶Vprincipal aims. Third, British structural realists 
contend that process formations, regional security complexes included, are unit level factors, 
which contrasts with typical definitions. However, this becomes problematic when they 
discuss the intervening effects of the regional level (Buzan, Jones, and Little 1993:50,72-79). 
In this respect, as Buzan (1986:3-4,1995:206-212) has done elsewhere, it is more logical to 
think of a regional complex as a discreet level of analysis which is external to the state but 
which nevertheless constrains and incentivizes its possible action.  
Although some have drawn attention to the regional level of analysis (Lake 1997:46-48; 
Buzan and Wæver 2003:77; Kelly 2007:202-204), especially in the realist foreign policy 
analysis literature it is often overlooked. Nevertheless, as Buzan (1986:4,my emphasis) notes, 
WKHUHJLRQDOOHYHOLV³YLWDOWRWKHRYHUDOOSLFWXUHRIVHFXULW\UHODWLRQV´becausHLW³SURYLGHVD
VWURQJPHGLDWLQJ IDFWRUEHWZHHQ WKHJUHDWSRZHUVDQG ORFDOVWDWHV´&RQVHTXHQWO\XQOHVV LW
³LVSURSHUO\FRPSUHKHQGHGQHLWKHU WKHSRVLWLRQRI WKH ORFDO VWDWHV LQ UHODWLRQ WRHDFKRWKHU
nor the character of relations between the great powers and local states, can be understood 
properly´ 
Defining what constitutes a region is of course problematic (Morgan 1997:25). Buzan 
(1991a:190), however, provides a succinct definition of a regional security complex, namely 
D³JURXSRIVWDWHVZKRVHSULPDU\VHFXULW\FRQFHUQVOLQNWRJHWKHUVXIILFLHQWO\FORVHO\WKDWWKHLU
QDWLRQDOVHFXULWLHVFDQQRWUHDVRQDEO\EHFRQVLGHUHGDSDUWIURPRQHDQRWKHU´This is because 
of geographical proximity: as threats travel more easily over shorter distances the security 
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concerns of neighboring states are intimately connected (Buzan and Wæver 2003:4). That is, 
states within a regional complex are interdependent. As Buzan and Wæver (2003:47-48) note, 
FRPSOH[HV ³PXVW SRVVHVV D GHJUHH RI VHFXULW\ LQterdependence sufficient both to establish 
them as a linked set and to differentiate them from VXUURXQGLQJ VHFXULW\ UHJLRQV´. These 
interdependencies can be either positive (regional actors sharing common threat conceptions) 
or negative (regional actors perceiving each other as hostile) (Buzan and Wæver 2009:256). 
Complexes are distinguished from states as they have no actor quality, although some, for 
example the European Union, may display patterns of institutionalized cooperation, and they 
are differentiated from the international system because they are a smaller part of a larger 
whole (Buzan and Wæver 2003:27).  
Buzan and Wæver (2003:80-82) differ from other approaches to regional analysis on the 
issue of territorial exclusivity. In RSCT regions are territorially bounded, meaning that 
extraregional powers normally only interact with rather than significantly influence local 
dynamics. Regional complexes, in other words, are self-contained ± WKH\ KDYH D ³G\QDPLF
that would exist even if other actors did noWLPSLQJHRQLW´%X]DQDThe structure 
of a region is also composed of its material balance of power, making it largely consistent 
with realism (Buzan and Wæver 2003:53). The polarity of the system can be altered by 
factors internal to the region, such as revolution and differentiated economic development, or 
through external intervention. Although RSCT provides no specific method for quantifying 
the distribution of capabilities, traditional indices include military capabilities, economic 
power, and manpower.  
Regional security theorists also draw on the work of Wolfers (1962:25) who wrote that the 
drama of international relations was found in the interrelations of the actors involved, namely 
whether relations were characterized by amity or enmity. Buzan (1991a:190) defines a 
UHODWLRQVKLS RI DPLW\ DV RQH ZKLFK UDQJHV ³IURP JHQXLQH IULHQGVKLS WR H[SHFWDWLRQV RI 
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VXSSRUW´ ZKLOVWDUHODWLRQVKLSRIHQPLW\LV³VHWE\VXVSLFLRQDQGIHDU´. Social relations are not 
zero sum but instead exist along a spHFWUXPDQGLQEHWZHHQWKHWZRSROHV³LVDEURDGEDQGRI
indifference and neutrality, which amity and enmity are either too weak to matter much, or 
HOVHPL[HGLQDZD\WKDWSURGXFHVQRFOHDUOHDQLQJRQHZD\RUWKHRWKHU´%X]DQa:190). 
Social relations are influenced by a number of subjective factors including ideological 
affinity, conflict, shared history, territorial cohesiveness, the extent of shared political and 
societal norms, and the extent of ethnic and cultural ties (Buzan 1986:7-10). Social relations, 
KRZHYHU FDQQRWEH UHGXFHG WR WKHGLVWULEXWLRQRISRZHU$V%X]DQ QRWHV ³DPLW\
and enmity is only partly related to the balance of power, and where it is related, it is much 
stickier than the relatively fluid movement of the distribution RI SRZHU´ ,Q WXUQ ³WKH WZR
SDWWHUQV PXVW EH FRQVLGHUHG DV GLVWLQFW IDFWRUV´ Adding patterns of amity and enmity is 
necessary however because it provides ³DFOHDUHUVHQVHRIWKHUHODWLRQDOSDWWHUQDQGFKDUDFWHU
of insecurity [in a regional security complex] than that provided by the raw abstraction of the 
balance-of-SRZHU´ %X]DQ D 2I FRXUVH SDWWHUQV RI DPLW\ DQG HQPLW\ DUH
subjective, which in turn means they are difficult to accurately gauge (Buzan 1986:7-8). 
1HYHUWKHOHVV WKH ³PDLQ IHDWXUHV usually stand out quite clearly even in the absence of 
VFLHQWLILFVFDOHV>RIPHDVXUHPHQW@´%X]DQD 
RSCT also classifies regional complexes according to their character. Buzan and Wæver 
(2003:55-62) distinguish between standard and centered complexes. The former are typically 
driven by military and security concerns, and can be unipolar through multipolar. Centered 
complexes, on the other hand, are defined by the inclusion of a superpower, great power, 
dominant regional power, or an institutional center. Conflict formation, security regime, and 
security community complexes are also identified as ideal types in the literature. A region 
which is defined by patterns of enmity is characterized as a conflict formation complex whilst 
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a region which is characterized by strong bonds of amity is better thought of as a security 
regime or security community complex. 
56&7¶VFDXVDOPRGHOLVEDVHGRQWKHSULQFLSOHWKDWWKHUHJLRQDOOHYHO³ZLOOQHDUO\DOZD\VEH
in play in some significant sense, and cannot be GURSSHG RXW RI WKH DQDO\VLV´ %X]DQ DQG
Wæver 2003:52). This is because the regional level of analysis is crucial for appreciating how 
states interact with their closest neighbors and how such interactions influence the strategies 
of a nonregional power. Although RSCT has primarily concentrated on the former (Hettne 
1991; Peimani 1998; Acharya 2001; Buzan 2003; Buzan and Wæver 2003; Stewart-Ingersoll 
and Frazier 2012), the latter was one of the principal aims that RSCTs hoped to make (Buzan 
and Wæver 2003:46±47).  
Although the extent to which the regional level influences an external SRZHU¶VIRUHLJQSROLF\
is an empirical question, it must necessarily shape the strategic environment in which an 
extraregional power conducts its foreign policy. External powers can influence regional 
developments through penetration, principally by providing economic assistance, military aid 
and support, or through formal or informal alliances. Generally, external powers will 
³QRUPDOO\ UHLQIRUFH UDWKHU WKDQ FKDQJH WKH H[LVWLQJ SDWWHUQ RI ORFDO KRVWLOLW\´ %X]DQ
1986:26). In extreme cases, however, external powers can overlay a region by directly 
imposing their presence on it. In turn, local ³VHFXULW\FRQFHUQVDUHRYHUULGGHQE\WKHVHFXULW\
orientation of the dominating power, and this orientation is reinforced by the stationing of 
WKDW SRZHU¶V PLOLWDU\ IRUFHV GLUHFWO\ ZLWKLQ WKH ORFDO FRPSOH[´ (Buzan 1986:24-
26,1991a:197-198).  
If it is true that, alongside the international distribution of capabilities and the internal 
policymaking environment, regional balances of power and patterns of enmity and amity 
influence US foreign policy, and realist foreign policy analysts have overlooked this, then the 
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conclusions they have drawn regarding the sources of US foreign policy in the Persian Gulf 
may be overstated. The subsequent section will discuss this in greater depth. 
The Persian Gulf Security Complex and US Foreign Policy 
Although the Persian Gulf has been called a subregional complex (Buzan and Wæver 
2003:191-193), Buzan (1986:9-11,1991a:194-196) has in the past defined the Gulf, which 
consists of the states bordering the waterway, namely Iran, Iraq, and the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC), an alliance of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United 
Arab Emirates, as a regional security complex. Whether the region is a complex or a 
subcomplex is trivial: not only are the definitions comparable (Buzan and Wæver 2003:51), 
the principle that the region exhibits the characteristics of a security complex is already 
established in the literature (Gause 2010; Ehteshami 2013). This is EHFDXVHRI WKH UHJLRQ¶V
security interdependencies, namely its oil, which in the next decade is predicted to provide up 
to two-thirds of WKH ZRUOG¶V VXSSO\ $FFRUGLQJO\ the economies of the Gulf are mutually 
reliant on open sea ODQHVVWDEOHWUDQVLWDQGWKHILQDQFLDOVWDELOLW\RIWKHZRUOG¶VRLOLPSRUWHUV
Additionally, the Gulf is home to a number of negative interdependencies including religious 
rivalries, territorial disputes, and political divisions (Sick and Potter 2002). 
Owing to pervasive conflict in the region, it is possible to classify the Gulf as a structured 
conflict formation complex. The region has historically been defined by the tripolar balance 
between Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq (Buzan and Wæver 2003:55), while the smaller 
members have been less influential (Buzan 1986:9-11). Nevertheless the tripolar balance is 
often exaggerated: in comparison to its northern neighbors Saudi Arabia is militarily weak. 
Indeed, analysts contend that the Iraqi-Iranian rivalry has had the most influence on the 
region¶V dynamics (Katzman 1998:3). Accordingly Saudi Arabia has had to balance Iran via 
Iraq and vice-versa or rely on western support to counter its northern rivals (Cordesman 
2003:44). After the 1991 Gulf War, and LQGHHG WKH *&&¶V IDLOXUH WR FR-opt Egyptian and 
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Syrian security assistance (Joffé 1998:53-54), local hostilities OHG WR WKH IRUPHU ,UDT¶V
invasion of Kuwait created permanent hostility between it and Saudi Arabia while ideological 
and political enmity characterized relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia (Cordesman 
1997:8,129). 
Because of the link between political economy, political stability, and energy security the US 
considers the Gulf vital to its national security (Brzezinski, Scowcroft, and Murphy 1997). 
Since the 1930s the US has ensured Saudi Arabia¶V LQGHSHQGHQFH WKH *XOI¶V ODUJHVW RLO
producer (Bronson 2006), by acting offshore and allowing surrogate powers including Britain 
and then Pahlavi Iran to guarantee regional security (Sick 1986:15-24). The Iranian 
revolution, however, created an ideological division between Iran and its southern neighbors 
(Ramazani 1988:6-8) and between Iran and the US (Pollack 2005:172). In turn, the US 
mirrored shifts in the region¶V hostilities and tilted towards Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War 
(Hollis 2004). It even effectively entered the conflict in its final years (Wise 2007), which 
resulted in a relatively enduring hostile Iranian attitude towards the US (Beeman 2005; Blight 
et al. 2012). 
,UDT¶V  LQYDVLRQ RI .XZDLW DQG WKH VXEVHTXHQW ZDU WUDQVIRUPHG WKH international 
relations of the region DQGTXLFNO\ UHYHUVHG$PHULFD¶V nascent relationship with Iraq. The 
GCC, fearing the potential threat from a revanchist Iraq and a revisionist Iran (Cordesman 
1993:1), concluded bilateral defense agreements with the US, allowing it to use local 
facilities and preposition military equipment. This complemented existing facilities in 
Bahrain and Oman, furnished the US with greater deterrent and crisis response capabilities, 
and created a highly visible military presence in the region (Hajjar 2002:19-29).  
American penetration, which was designed to contain Iraqi intransigence and deter Iran from 
establishing itself as the principal regional power (Hoar 1992), couQWHUDFWHG WKH *XOI¶V
imbalance, becoming a substitute for WKH *&&¶V traditional balance of power strategy and 
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AmericD¶V WUDGLWLRQDO Vurrogate policy. Developments at the regional level, in effect, 
IDFLOLWDWHG$PHULFD¶VULVHDVWKHUHJLRQ¶VVHFXULW\JXDUDQWRU/RQJDQG.RFN. And as 
discussed below, regional developments continued to influence US foreign policy throughout 
the 1990s. In other words, the rise and fall of dual containment was as equally conditioned by 
the regional level of analysis as it was by the international and domestic levels of analysis.   
  'XDO&RQWDLQPHQW¶V5LVH 
The Clinton administration waVILUPO\FRPPLWWHGWRVHFXULQJ$PHULFD¶VWUDGLWLRQDOLQWHUHVWV
in the Gulf. Secretary of State Warren Christopher (1993) assured the GCC states that 
³3UHVLGHQW &OLQWRQ¶V FRPPLWPHQW WR WKH VHFXULW\ RI RXU IULHQGV LQ WKH *XOI«is firm and 
FRQVWDQW´In the post-Cold War era it was believed that Iraq and Iran posed the greatest threat 
to the southern Gulf. Assistant Secretary of State Edward Djerejian (1993), as an example, 
stated that the GCC was ³YXOQHUDEOHWRDJJUHVVLRQIURPDQXQUHSHQWDQW,UDTRUDUHDUPHd and 
LGHRORJLFDOO\ DVVHUWLYH ,UDQ´ Accordingly the administration opted for a policy of dual 
containment. Rather than tilting towards one of the larger northern Gulf countries they hoped 
³WRPDLQWDLQDIDYRUDEOHEDODQFHZLWKRXWGHSHQGLQJRQHLWKHU,UDTRU,UDQ´/DNH 
To do this the administration supported the continuation of the no-fly-zone and the United 
1DWLRQV¶HPEDUJRKRSLQJWKDWWKLVZRXOGLQH[SHQVLYHO\FUHDWH6DGGDP¶VGRZQIDOO6FLROLQR
1993). Regarding Iran, unilateral sanctions were preserved while diplomacy was employed to 
persuade others to limit military, financial, and technological trade with the Islamic Republic 
(Smith and Williams 1993).  
Mearsheimer and Walt attribute $PHULFD¶VH[SDQGLQJ role to the combination of US primacy, 
intellectual currents, and the influence of parochial lobbyists. Rather than acting offshore, 
specific strategic ideas and the pervasive influence of the Israeli lobby (Mearsheimer and 
Walt 2008:287; Mearsheimer 2011) resulted in dual containment and the expansion of 
$PHULFD¶Vcommitment to the region, which is a conclusion shared by other realist foreign 
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policy analysts (Edwards 2013). This perspective, however, overlooks how the Persian Gulf 
security complex equally shapHGWKH&OLQWRQDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶Vstrategic options.  
Although Iraq and Iran were economically weak (Cordesman and Hashim 1997a:124-
127,1997b:29-42), they dwarfed their southern neighbors in terms of manpower (Cordesman 
1993:13-14). Iraq was believed to have rebuilt much of its military capability and it remained 
a formidable threat to the GCC while Iran had expanded its naval and missile capabilities 
(Cordesman 1993:393-429,433-516). Although there was uncertainty regarding Iranian 
intentions, ,UDQ¶V seizure of strategically significant islands in the Gulf and large military 
H[HUFLVHVLQWKH6WUDLWRI+RUPX]ZHUHEHOLHYHGWRLOOXVWUDWH,UDQ¶Vdesire to revise the status-
quo (Cordesman and Hashim 1997b:126-134). Owing to this material imbalance, and indeed 
the slow pace of collective security arrangements WKH *XOI PRQDUFKLHV KDG WR ³UHO\ RQ
:HVWHUQ SRZHU SURMHFWLRQ FDSDELOLWLHV DV WKH RQO\ VXEVWLWXWH IRU VWURQJ FROOHFWLYH GHIHQVH´
(Cordesman 1993:666).  
Whilst in the past the GCC could offset the imbalance of power by tilting towards either Iran 
RU ,UDT WKH UHJLRQ¶V SDWWHUQV RI HQPity ruled this out. Although Qatar re-established 
GLSORPDWLFUHODWLRQVZLWK,UDTLPPHGLDWHO\DIWHUWKH*XOI:DU6KDUS6DXGL$UDELD¶V
belief that Iraq could only ever be hostile GRPLQDWHGWKH*&&¶VSROLF\(Cordesman 1997:8). 
Additionally, suspicion regarding Iranian support of anti-regime activists, divergent attitudes 
towards the Middle East peace process, and continuing territorial disputes meant that the 
relationship between the GCC and Iran was largely unfriendly (Ehteshami 2002:302). This 
was again driven mainly by Saudi Arabia. As Cordesman (1997:8) explained³VHQLRU6DXGL
officials treat Iran as a hostile power committed to trying to dominate the Gulf and exporting 
LWVRZQEUDQGRIUHYROXWLRQDU\H[WUHPLVP´  
This is overlooked by realist foreign policy analysts. Mearsheimer and Walt (2008:287) use 
Kenneth Pollack to support their conclusions. And although Pollack (2005:261,my emphasis) 
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did wriWHWKDW³LWZDVRIWHQ,VUDHO¶VVHFXULW\FRQFHUQVDQGWKHLQWHUUHODWHGQHHGVRIWKHSHDFH
process that were the maiQSURGVWR86DFWLRQRQ,UDQ´he also wrote that ³,VUDHOZDVQRW
alone in this: Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and other Arab states also felt threatened by Iran during 
the early 1990s, and they too pressed Washington for a tougher line toward Tehran ± ,VUDHO¶V
was often just WKHORXGHVWDPRQJPDQ\YRLFHV´ Furthermore, even if the enmity between the 
southern Gulf and Iran did not exisW WKH,UDQLDQOHDGHUVKLS¶VDWWLWXGHWRZDUGVWKH86 was a 
powerful constraint on American strategy, a point only fleetingly acknowledged by 
Mearsheimer and Walt (2008:290). Indeed, President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani argued that 
resuming relations with the 86 ZDV ³LQFRPSDWLEOH ZLWK SXEOLF RSLQLRQ DQG WKH SULQFLSOHG
aims of ouU UHYROXWLRQ´ %%& D ZKLOH the Supreme Leader ruled out any dialogue, 
preferring instead to demonize the US as the enemy of the Islamic revolution (BBC 
1993b,c,d). In other words, Iranian enmity towards the US crucially influenced the Clinton 
DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶V VWUDWHJLF RSWLRQV, making a surrogate relationship with Iran largely 
unfeasible.  
Specific strategic ideas, American primacy, and powerful interest groups were important 
factors resulting in dual containment, as realist foreign policy analysts argue. Regional 
factors, however, played an equally important role. A subtler account of US foreign policy 
has to pay equal attention to how the PHUVLDQ *XOI¶V VSHFLILFG\QDPLFV equally shaped US 
strategy. That is, the specific patterns of enmity in the Gulf together with the material 
imbalance between the north and the south forced the GCC states to look outside for security 
assistance. In turn, dual containment was a logical outcome.  
The Unravelling of Dual Containment 
Nevertheless, in the latter half of the 1990s dual containment noticeably transformed. To 
quote Martin Indyk, GXDO FRQWDLQPHQW¶V principal architect, it EHFDPH ³µFRQWDLQPHQW SOXV
regime change [on the ,UDTL VLGH@¶´DQG³µFRQtainment until they are ready for engagement 
>RQ WKH ,UDQLDQ VLGH@¶´ 'XPEUHOO  Realist foreign policy analysts stress the 
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determining impact of domestic influences at this juncture. They argue that the policy of 
regime change was shaped by neoconservative groups and that the Israeli lobby poisoned any 
possible US-Iranian rapprochement by pressuring Congress into taking a hardened stance 
towards Iran (Fields 2007:147-159; Mearsheimer and Walt 2008:243-245,287-291; Edwards 
2013). 
Realist foreign policy analysts, however, neglect the importance of the regional level 
analysis. Although the material imbalance between the north and south remained (Cordesman 
1997), owing to the Iraq embargo DQG,UDQ¶VVXFFHVVIXODGMXVWPHQWWRits containment (Bahgat 
1997), Iranian power increased relative to Iraq (Cordesman 1998:37). This engendered 
DVVHUWLYHQHVV LQ ,UDQ¶V IRUHLJQ UHODWLRQV It became an important benefactor of groups 
opposing the peace process (Katzman 1995) and allegedly facilitated an uptake in terrorist 
attacks, especially a lethal 1994 bombing in Tel Aviv (Lynfield and Binyon 1994). 
Additionally Iran striveG WR ³LQWLPLGDWH WKH *&& VWDWHV DQG VHSDUDWH WKHP IURP WKHLU
SURWHFWRUWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV´.DW]PDQPDLQO\E\VSRQVRULQJWZRERPELQJVRI US 
military facilities in Saudi Arabia. US sanctions on Iran (Katzman 2000a:11-14) certainly 
UHIOHFWHG WKH OHJLVODWXUH¶V YLFWRU\ LQ WKH policy struggle (Murray 2010:102-107), 
corroborating the realist foreign policy analysis perspective. Nevertheless, given that the 
legislation followed provocative Iranian actions, which were in part produced by an increase 
LQ ,UDQ¶V UHODWLve power, the change in the regional balance of power also influenced the 
direction of US policy. 
Concurrent to this, patterns of hostility in the Persian Gulf were transforming, which in turn 
DOWHUHG$PHULFD¶Vstrategic calculus. Although Iraq was able to generate sympathy amongst 
some of the smaller monarchies (Tripp 2007:252- 6DXGL $UDELD¶V GLVWUXVW RI Saddam 
FRQWLQXHG WRXQGHUZULWH ,UDT¶V LVRODWLRQ &RUGHVPDQ-204). Nevertheless the GCC 
became increasingly dissatisfied with US policy, and, wary of domestic unrest, began 
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distancing themselves from their protector (Gerges 1997:61). Iran, especially after moderate 
Mohammad Khatami came to power, exploited this and established new bonds of friendship 
with the southern Gulf states (Ehteshami 2002:302-303). As the Arab nations boycotted a US 
regional conference because of American foreign policy (Lancaster 1997), Tehran 
symbolically held the Organization of Islamic Conference. This marked the beginning of a 
new era of amity between Iran and the Arab world, especially between Iran and Saudi Arabia 
(Thedoulou 1997).  
In contrast to what RSCT would predict, the US did not shadow this development. As realist 
foreign policy analysts argue, domestic influences certainly made an Iranian tilt politically 
toxic. Iranian demonization of the US was of equal importance, however (Beeman 2005). The 
Clinton administration, eQWKXVHGE\.KDWDPL¶VVRIWHQHGVWDQFH5LHGHODQGWKHEHOLHI
WKDW³EHWWHUUHODWLRQVZLWK,UDQFRXOGFRQWDLQ,UDT´.DW]PDQa:21), disregarded its own 
legislation (Jehl 1998); threatened to veto sanctions on Russian firms supplying Iran with 
missile technology (Gertz 1998); and publically welcomed a closer relationship (Albright 
1998). However, Iranian hardliners opposed these overtures (BBC 1998a,b,c), and moderates 
including Khatami, who called for America to vacate the Persian Gulf (BBC 1998d), and 
Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi, who refused to meet with his American counterpart 
(Albright 2003:322-323), followed suit. Although the moderates were certainly pressed into 
this by the Supreme Leader (Arjomand 2009:146-147), as Gold (2009:141) makes clear: 
³7KHERWWRPOLQHZDVWKDWHYHQZKHQ>WKH&OLQWRQDGPLQLVWUDWLRQZDV@UHDFKLQJRXWGLVFUHHWO\
WR,UDQ>LWZDV@XQDEOHWRHVWDEOLVKDFKDQQHORIFRPPXQLFDWLRQ´  
The failure to adapt to the UHJLRQ¶V FKDQJLQJ patterns of amity and enmity coincided with 
intensified efforts to overthrow Saddam, which suggests that these developments were in 
some way connected. Perhaps sensing $PHULFD¶VDQGWKH*&&¶VZHDNHQHGUHVROYH, Saddam 
began to systematically challenge ,UDT¶V FRQWDLQPHQW by barring US nationals from 
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conducting weapon inspections, which in turn created a lengthy crisis regarding the 
continuation of the weapon inspections and the economic embargo (Goshko and Lippman 
1997). In response WR ,UDT¶V SURYRFDWLYH DFWLRQV the Clinton administration made regime 
change official policy (Prados 2002:5-6) and undertook a limited war WR VHFXUH 6DGGDP¶V
acquiescence (Prados and Katzman 2001:3-5). The limited war never ceased (Pelletiere 
1999:18-20) however, DQG DFFRUGLQJ WR :DOWHU 6ORFRPEH &OLQWRQ¶V 8QGHU 6HFUHWDU\ RI
Defense, it was hoped that it would FUHDWH WKH ³µSROLWLFDO DQG PLOLWDU\ FRQGLWLRQV WKDW ZLOO
SHUPLWDVXFFHVVIXOFKDQJHRIWKH>,UDTL@UHJLPH¶´0\HUVDQG:HLQHU  
For some in the administration, 6DGGDP¶VRYHUWKURZSURPLVHGZLGHUEHQHILWVBruce Riedel 
(1999), an advisor in the National Security Council, hoped that it ZRXOGUHVXOW LQD³VWURQJ
and healthy Iraq [returning] WRWKHFRPPXQLW\RIQDWLRQVDQG«[playing] its appropriate role 
in international aQGUHJLRQDODIIDLUV´. He even noted WKDW³America and Iraq have been close 
SDUWQHUVLQWKHSDVWDQGWKH\FDQEHSDUWQHUVDQGIULHQGVDJDLQLQWKHIXWXUH´ These words are 
very suggestive as the last surrogate relationship with Iraq was primarily a counterweight to 
Iranian power. A post-Saddam Iraq, in other words, may have duplicated this, allowed the US 
to scale back its regional presence, and in doing so ease the internal pressure that the GCC 
states were facing. At the very least, this idea was certainly held by individuals associated 
with neoconservative organizations. Michael Eisenstadt (1996), an analyst with the 
:DVKLQJWRQ ,QVWLWXWH IRU 1HDU (DVW 3ROLF\ FRQWHQGHG WKDW EHFDXVH WKH ³VWDWXV TXR LQ ,UDT
VHUYHV7HKUDQZHOO´UHJLPHFKDQJHLQ%DJKGDGZRXOGEHWKH³EHst way to further constrain 
,UDQ¶VIUHHGRPWRPDQHXYHU´$IWHU6DGGDP¶VGHSDUWXUH(LVHQVWDGWDUJXHG,UDQ³ZRXOGRQFH
DJDLQ KDYH WR ZRUU\ DERXW ,UDT DV D PLOLWDU\ WKUHDW« DQG DERXW WKH SRVVLELOLW\ RI D
rapprochement between Iraq anGWKH$UDE*XOIVWDWHVWKDWZRXOGIXUWKHULVRODWHLW´ 
As realist foreign policy analysts have done, one can attribute the genesis of the regime 
change policy to specific intellectual currents and the narrow concerns of certain interest 
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groups, and how these captured policymaking in the era of US primacy. This perspective, 
however, is incomplete. Regional factors, including the relative rise in Iranian power, the 
FKDQJLQJ SDWWHUQV RI ORFDO KRVWLOLWLHV ,UDT¶V LQFUHDVLQJ LQWUDQVLJHQFH WRZDUGV WKH &OLQWRQ
adPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶VSUHIHUUHGSROLF\DQG WKH ,UDQLDQ OHDGHUVKLS¶VDWWLWXGH WRZDUGV WKH86DOVR
played a part in bringing this idea to fruition. Indeed with the latter, alongside domestic 
opposition in the US, effectively ruling out an Iranian surrogate relationship, a Saddam-less 
Iraq became an increasingly attractive substitute.  
'XDO&RQWDLQPHQW¶V)DOO 
Like the Clinton administration, the George W. Bush administration also viewed the Persian 
Gulf as being of critical importance to US security (Cheney 2001:8/4). Although dual 
FRQWDLQPHQW¶V ORJLFZDVTXHVWLRQHG ODFNLQJDQ\DOWHUQDWLYHV WKHDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ sustained it 
(Katzman et al. 2001). The low-level war in Iraq continued while the administration aided the 
,UDTL RSSRVLWLRQ VXSSRUWHG WKH HPEDUJR¶V FRQWLQXDtion, modified to address humanitarian 
concerns, and hoped to re-HVWDEOLVK PRQLWRULQJ RI ,UDT¶V ZHDSRQV SURJUDPV 3RZHOO ; 
Prados 2002:5-7). Unilateral sanctioning of Iran also continued despite opposition (Scowcroft 
2001). The policy drift stopped after the September 11 terrorist attacks, however (Rumsfeld 
2011:419±421). Iraq and Iran were demonized as part of an axis of evil; the former was 
invaded in an unpopular war; while the latter was subjected to increasingly hostile threats 
which remain to this day.   
The realist foreign policy analysis perspective, especially as employed by Mearsheimer and 
Walt (2008:233-253,291-295), attributes these policies to US primacy, a heightened sense of 
vulnerability following the terrorist attacks, the rise of neoconservatism, and the influence of 
the Israeli lobby. Mearsheimer and Walt (2003) opposed the invasion of Iraq, which was in 
part based on the argument that the US should have improved relations with Iran in order to 
balance Iraq (Mearsheimer 2002:16); and that it did not was because of domestic influences 
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which negatively influenced the policymaking process. This perspective, however, overlooks 
the fact that regional factors also FRQVWUDLQHG$PHULFD¶VVWUDWHJLFRSWLRQV.  
To begin with, the durable imbalance of power in the Gulf persisted. Indeed, one analysis 
FRQFOXGHGWKDW³(YHQZLWKDZHDNHQHG,UDTDQGDPRGHUDWLQJ,UDQPRVWH[SHUWVEHOLHYHWKH
*&&FRXQWULHVFDQQRWIDFHWKHLUVHFXULW\FKDOOHQJHVDORQHRUHYHQLQFRQFHUWZLWKHDFKRWKHU´
(Katzman 2000b:17). As discussed, the US-GCC defense agreements solved this dilemma 
while at the same time they furnished the US with the capability of containing Iraq and 
deterring Iran. However, developments located within the region began to threaten this 
capacity. Iraq proved victorious in the war of the sanctions (Cordesman 1999). The Bush 
administration was unable to secure the reintroduction of the inspection teams (Crossette 
2001) while Iraq was able to free itself from economic isolation (Barr 2001). At the same 
time$PHULFD¶VPLOLWDU\SUHVHQFHLQWKH*XOISODFHGVXEVWDQWLDOSUHVVXUHRQWKH*&&VWDWHV
In fact Saudi Arabia, after a lethal US airstrike in Iraq in early 2001, scaled back its military 
relationship with the US (Pollack 2002:86). By this juncture BaJKGDG¶V ³ORQJ VWUXJJOH WR
RXWODVW WKH FRQWDLQPHQW SROLF\ RI WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV«VHHPHG WDQWDOL]LQJO\ FORVH´ 'XHOIHU
2004:12). In this contextDQGZLWK6DGGDP¶VQHHG WRVHFXUHKLV UHJLPHERWK LQWHUQDOO\DQG
externally, the assumption that he had and would pursue a threatening weapons program was 
not an infeasible one (Pollack 2004).  
Developments in the *XOI¶s patterns of amity and enmity also WKUHDWHQHG$PHULFD¶VUHJLRQDO
position. Influenced by uncertainty over $PHULFD¶V GHWHUPLQDWLRQ WR overthrow Saddam 
(Woodward 2004:228- ,UDQ¶V LPSURYHG LPDJH DIWHU .KDWDPL¶V HOHFWLRQ, and the 
continued threat that Iraq posed (McLean 2001:29-54), Saudi Arabia concluded a mutual 
security agreement with Iran. While it contained no military dimension, it symbolized that the 
two regional adversaries now saw their role as joint guarantors of regional security (Sick and 
Potter 2002:4). For the Iranians at least, the pact symbolized the end of American hegemony 
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(BBC 2001a,b). And given that its conclusion was followed by a number of Iranian missile 
strikes along the Iraqi border (BBC 2001c), it also raised the spectre of another destabilizing 
conflict. Most importantly from $PHULFD¶V perspective the pact had the potential to 
undermine its regional position. Even before the pact was signed, a Congressional report 
theorized WKDW ,UDQ¶V DWWHPSWV WR ³µFKDUP¶ WKH *XOI VWDWHV LQWR VFDOLQJ EDFN WKHLU GHIHQVH
FRRSHUDWLRQZLWKWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV´PD\EH³SDUWRIDQHIIRUWWRUHSODFHWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVDV
WKH FKLHI *XOI SRZHU´ .DW]PDQ 2000b:19). The Persian Gulf security complex, in other 
words, had radically transformed: Iranian power had risen; Iraq was less contained; and 
$PHULFD¶VFDSDFLW\IRUcountering both was weakened.  
These developments, in combination with the impact of the 2001 terrorist attacks, led the 
%XVK DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ WR WKH QRW XQUHDVRQDEOH FRQFOXVLRQ WKDW ³µGXDO FRQWDLQPHQW¶ ZKLFK
isolated and punished both Iran and Iraq, was unwise and that United States could no longer 
KDYHERWKDVHQHPLHV´6FLROLQRDQG/HZLV). As before, however, factors located at the 
regional level constrained strategy. Domestic opposition to an Iranian tilt, no doubt inspired 
by the efforts of certain lobbying groups, was certainly palpable (Perle 2001). But of equal 
importance, and glossed over by realist foreign policy analysts, was the attitude in Iran 
towards the US. Iranian leaders remained wedded to the idea that the US was the enemy 
(BBC 2001d,e,f); the Supreme Leader, despite tacitly cooperating with America in 
Afghanistan, made similar claims (BBC 2001g); and moderates such as President Khatami 
and former President Rafsanjani did likewise (BBC 2001h,i). 
As dual containment had been ruled out and hostility made a surrogate relationship with Iran 
impractical, the idea of a surrogate relationship with a Saddam-less Iraq seemed an 
increasingly necessary gamble. Indeed some in the Bush administration thought that the road 
to Tehran ran through Baghdad. Donald Rumsfeld (2001), for instance, wrote a memorandum 
shortly before 9/11 which notHGWKDW³The particular unfortunate circumstances of Iraq being 
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governed by Saddam and Iran being governed by the clerics have suspended the standard rule 
WKDW µP\HQHP\¶VHQHP\ LVP\ IULHQG¶ ,I6DGGDP¶V UHJLPHZHUHRXVWHGZHZRXOGKDYHD
much-improved pRVLWLRQ LQ WKH UHJLRQ DQG HOVHZKHUH´ 5XPVIHOG¶V YLHZ ZDV VKDUHG E\
Condoleezza Rice (2011:164) who H[SODLQV LQ KHU PHPRLUV WKDW ³7KH µ3HUVLDQ¶
FKDOOHQJH«KDGWREHFRXQWHUEDODQFHGVLQFHLWFRXOGQRWEHGHVWUR\HG,UDTKLVWRULFDOO\VHUYHG
DVWKLVEXIIHU´ 
In combination with American primacy, a range of domestic factors, including the 
ascendancy of neoconservative ideas and ideologues, the impact of the 2001 terrorist attacks, 
and the powerful influence of the Israeli lobby (Monten 2005; Mearsheimer and Walt 
2008:229-262; Taliaferro, Lobell, and Ripsman 2009:3; Rose 2010:240), prodded the Bush 
administration into its war with Iraq. To focus on these developments alone, however, does 
injustice to the regional developments which equally conditioned the decision to choose war 
over containment. ,QSDUWLFXODUWKHLQIHDVLELOLW\RIGXDOFRQWDLQPHQWWKHVKLIWLQWKHUHJLRQ¶V
patterns of amity, the shifting balance of power, and Iranian hostility towards the US were all 
equally important factors which led to the invasion of Iraq.  
Beyond Dual Containment 
The 2003 invasion of Iraq marked the shift from US penetration to US overlay of the Persian 
*XOI$OWKRXJKLQZD\VQRWDOZD\VDGYDQWDJHRXVWRWKH86WKHUHJLRQ¶VG\QDPLFVKDYHEHHQ
SRZHUIXOO\WUDQVIRUPHGE\$PHULFD¶V permanent presence and the dismembering of Iraq. At 
the same time, however, the US ended the unpopular military presence in Saudi Arabia while 
retaining a significant deterrent capacity elsewhere in the region. Coincidentally the 
relationship between the GCC and Iran has returned to one of hostility ± the GCC states have 
aligned themselves with the US regarding opposition to ,UDQ¶Vuranium enrichment program 
and its bid for regional hegemony (Katzman 2013:38-41), although the extent to which this 
has been produced by overlay, by developments in the region itself, or because of long-term 
antagonism between Iran and Saudi Arabia is unclear. Nevertheless, the future of the Persian 
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Gulf complex is likely to depend on the continued rivalry between these two powers. But 
how this rivalry takes shape is far from certain: the 2013 Iranian election, the Arab Spring, 
the crisis in Syria, and a potential bargain on Iranian enrichment will shape regional 
dynamics in unpredictable ways. In turn, these developments will contextualize future US 
policy.  
Whilst US policy in the Gulf is undoubtedly influenced by factors located at the international 
level and factors located at the policymaking level, it is also crucially shaped by regional 
developments. Indeed, American interests in the post-Cold War era have not expanded 
consistently. The specific local hostilities, the confrontational and unstable regional balance 
of power, and the specific security interdependencies found in the Persian Gulf have all 
FRQWULEXWHGWR$PHULFD¶VH[SDQGLQJUROH2IFRXUVHRSCT could be criticized for failing to 
distinguish between the international and the regional level, effectively downscaling system-
wide rules to the regional level (Lake 1997:48; Kelly 2007:206). Nevertheless this is not the 
intention of Buzan and his collaborators. Instead, the framework overcomes WKH³DQDO\WLFDO
and policy errors of the Cold War in which superpower dynamics were given far too much 
weight, and regional ones far too little, in evaluating events in the Middle East, Southeast 
$VLDDQGHOVHZKHUH´%X]DQand Wæver 2003:81-82). In this respect, adding RSCT to realist 
foreign policy analysis ± creating realist foreign policy analysis with a twist ± corrects for a 
similar issue in realist foreign policy analyses of US foreign policy in the Persian Gulf. 
Conclusion 
Realist foreign policy analysts argue that the expansion of post-Cold War US foreign policy 
can be attributed to domestic factors which have induced policymakers to unilaterally act on 
the permissive international environment. Their argument is illustrated through a study of US 
policy in the Persian Gulf ± the most obvious example America¶V expanding goals, interests, 
and scope of action in the post-Cold War era. From this perspective, the controversial dual 
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containment strategy and the even more controversial invasion of Iraq can be attributed to the 
influence of specific strategic ideas and the power of certain lobby groups. 
Realist foreign policy analysis¶ value rests in its recognition that whilst external pressures 
may shape DQG VKRYH D FRXQWU\¶V DFWLRQV the policies it undertakes are still made by 
policymakers. In that respect realist foreign policy analysis synthesizes the systemic and 
foreign policy analysis traditions. In another respect, however, it is wanting: it overlooks how 
a great power¶s foreign policy is shaped by factors located at the regional level of analysis ± 
an equally powerful determinant of foreign policy. As a corrective, this paper drew on 
%X]DQ¶VRSCT to illustrate how the regional balance of power, local patterns of hostilities, 
and the fractious US-,UDQLDQ UHODWLRQVKLS HTXDOO\ FRQGLWLRQHG $PHULFD¶V VWUDWHJLF RSWLRQV
Indeed, although widely criticized, dual containment made sense in terms of the regional 
balance of power and the relationship of enmity between the northern and southern Gulf. As 
these changed, tilting towards Iran also made sense; however hostility in the US and in Iran 
to this development made this an unrealistic option. It was in this context that a post-Saddam 
Iraq was viewed as a necessary risk, and one which would ease pressure on $PHULFD¶V
UHJLRQDODOOLHVDQGFRXQWHUDFW,UDQ¶VJURZLQJUHJLRQDOVWUHQJWK 
,IDQH[SDQVLRQ LQDFRXQWU\¶V IRUHLJQSROLF\ LV JHQHUDOO\ FDXVHGE\DQ LQFrease in relative 
capabilities and the specifics of said expansion ± the when, how, and why ± are equally 
important, then so too is the where. The specific patterns of local hostilities, the 
confrontational and unstable regional balance of power, and the specific security 
interdependencies found in the Persian Gulf have all played an important role in pulling the 
US into the Persian Gulf security complex. Realist foreign policy analysis with a twist 
highlights this and gives a fuller account of the factors which have shaped US foreign policy 
in the Persian Gulf. In turn, if it is true that factors specific to the Persian Gulf have 
influenced the trajectory of US foreign policy, then in overlooking this realist foreign policy 
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analysts have overstated the role that domestic influences have had on US foreign policy. 
More broadly, this research points to an underlying problem with the theory, especially as 
applied to US foreign policy. Part of its appeal rests in its capacity for fleshing out the 
neorealist principle that the international system shapes and shoves but does not determine. 
Yet neorealism was not only inadequate for explaining actual foreign policy outcomes, as this 
work confirms its understanding of the international system was too abstract. If realist foreign 
policy analysts are serious about explaining actual policy outcomes, then a more elaborate 
understanding of systemic pressure is needed. %X]DQ¶VRSCT is a particularly useful starting 
point. 
At the same time, LI LW LVFRUUHFW WRDVVXPHWKDW$PHULFD¶V LQYDVLRQRI ,UDT represented US 
overlay of the Persian Gulf security complex, then it must be a rich case study for RSCTs to 
consider the effects of overlay in the contemporary era. Beyond this, the synthesis of realist 
foreign policy analysis with RSCT may prove useful for analyzing how and in what ways 
regional, domestic, and international factors combine to influence a great power¶s foreign 
policies. 7DNH WKH 2EDPD DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶V DSSURDFK WR WKH 0LGGOH (DVW DV DQ H[DPSOH
DOWKRXJKLQLWLDOO\KRSLQJWRPLQLPL]H$PHULFD¶VH[SRVXUHLQ WKHUHJLRQ LQZKDWZD\VKDYH
the anti-authoritarian uprisings reshaped the DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶V priorities? Likewise, how has 
WKHDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶VSURSRVHG$VLDQSLYRWDQGUHVSRQVHWR&KLQD¶VULVHEHHQFRQVWUDLQHGE\
historical rivalries between the countries in the region? Given that the United States is the 
only power with a truly global reach, it is a particularly useful case study for realist foreign 
policy analysis with a twist. However, with many predicting that the future world order may 
be defined by rising powers such as Brazil, Russia, India, and China amongst others, research 
will need to consider the regional as well as international and domestic factors that will 
FRQGLWLRQWKHVHSRZHUV¶H[SDQGLQJJRDOVLQWHUHVWVDQGVFRSHRIDFWLRQ 
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